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ORIGINAL ARTICLEHighly infectious diseases in the Mediterranean Sea area: Inventory of
isolation capabilities and recommendations for appropriate isolationF. M. Fusco1, P. Brouqui3 and G. Ippolito2, for the EuroNHID Working Group
1) Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Department, 2) Scientific Direction, National Institute for Infectious Diseases, ‘L. Spallanzani’, Rome, Italy and 3) Aix-
Marseille Université, IRD, MEPHI, IHU-Méditerranée Infection, Marseille, FranceAbstractEpidemics such as viral haemorrhagic fevers, severe acute respiratory syndrome, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus or yet
unknown ones have few chances of disappearing. Globalization, worldwide travel, climate change, social conflicts and wars, among others,
are likely to favor the emergence of epidemics. Preparedness of hospitals to prevent the spread of these outbreaks is among the
prioritized political programmes of many countries. The EuroNHID network has in the past drawn a map of features and equipment of
hospitals across Europe to take care of highly contagious patients. We update the data regarding isolation capabilities and
recommendations, with an emphasis on Mediterranean countries.
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Acknowledgements.IntroductionInfectious diseases are far from being defeated; they continue to
claim the attention of public health authorities. During the last
decades, ongoing phenomena such as globalization, global
warming and the increased movement of goods and persons
have accelerated the reemergence and rapid spread of old in-
fectious diseases as well as the development of new ones [1,2].
The threat of highly infectious diseases and the need for
high-level isolation units
Among emerging and reemerging diseases, some highly infec-
tious diseases (HIDs) (Table 1) represent a real challenge
because of their epidemic potential [3,4]. Recently many global
alarms involving HIDs occurred, such as the huge EbolaThis is an open access artioutbreak in West Africa, the spread of highly pathogenic avian
influenza A and the emergence of new coronaviruses such as
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East
respiratory syndrome (MERS). Some cases of imported or
autochthonous viral haemorrhagic fever occurred in Europe,
highlighting the need to improve preparedness for these dis-
eases [5]. In particular, these diseases cannot be cared for in
regular healthcare settings because their epidemic potential
may pose a risk to healthcare workers (HCWs) and other
patients. Patients with suspected or proven HIDs should be
cared for in a high-level isolation unit (HLIU), a facility
providing safe, secure, high-quality and appropriate care with
optimal infection containment, prevention and control pro-
cedures. The need for these isolation facilities was confirmed
during the Ebola outbreak of 2013–2015, during which many
patients were treated in highly specialized centres in Western
countries, with no case of secondary transmission. In contrast,
when patients with Ebola were hospitalized in non–specially
equipped hospitals, cases of transmission to HCWs
occurred, mainly in African countries but also in Western
countries [6].
In Europe, a panel of infectious disease clinicians and public
health officers with expertise in the management of HIDs,New Microbe and New Infect 2018; 26: S65–S73
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TABLE 1. Definition of highly infectious disease and list of
agents/diseases defined as highly infectious
A highly infectious disease
The diseases/agents listed as highly
infectious diseases
 Is transmissible from person
to person.
 Causes life-threatening illness.
 Presents a serious hazard
in healthcare settings and in the
community, requiring specific
control measures.
 Human-to-human transmissible viral
haemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Marburg,
Crimean Congo, Lassa and South
American haemorrhagic fever; Junin,
Machupo, Sabia and Guanarito viruses).
 SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV.
 Emerging highly pathogenic strains of
influenza virus.
 Smallpox and other orthopoxvirus
infections (e.g. monkeypox, but excluding
vaccinia virus).
 Extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis.
MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; SARS, severe acute respiratory
syndrome; CoV, coronavirus.
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different countries, participated in the EUNID (European
Network for Infectious Diseases physicians) and EuroNHID
(European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases) projects.
These projects were coordinated by the Italian National for
Infectious Diseases ‘L. Spallanzani’ Institute and supported by
specific grants from the European Commission. During these
projects, specific standards were developed, inventory of re-
sources were performed and recommendations for the optimal
management of HIDs and the operating of HLIUs were devel-
oped and disseminated [3,4,7,8].
The Mediterranean Sea: a crossroad for people and
infectious diseases
The Mediterranean Sea is almost completely surrounded by
land, as its name suggests: medi, ‘in the middle,’ and terranean,
‘of the land.’ Twenty-three countries and territories belonging
to Europe, North Africa and Middle Eastern Asia have coast-
lines on the Mediterranean Sea. Since ancient times the Medi-
terranean Sea has been an important route for merchants and
travellers that allowed for trade and cultural exchange between
different peoples of the region. Given its limited extension and
stable climatic conditions, it has long provided routes for trade,
colonization and war.
However, as people moved to other countries, infectious
diseases moved with them. Many different infectious diseases
were carried across the sea with travellers, merchants and
soldiers, often taking different names that suggested their pre-
sumed origin. For example, syphilis at the turn of the 15th and
16th centuries was known as the French disease in Naples and
as the Neapolitan disease in France.
In Mediterranean cities, the first isolation units to appear
were the lazarettos, named after Lazarus, the beggar, a man
with leprosy who appeared in the Christian tradition. The© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd, NMNI, 26, S65–S73
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licelazarettos were quarantine stations for maritime travellers. In
some of them items and goods were disinfected, usually by
fumigation, thus anticipating the modern infection control
procedures. The first lazarettos appeared in Venice and Vene-
tian colonies in the early 16th century. Other lazarettos where
established in many maritime cities, including Marseille and
Dubrovnik.
In recent years the Mediterranean Sea has represented one
of the most used routes of emigration by migrants from
developing countries who are seeking for a better future in
Europe. Hundreds of thousands of people are crossing the
Mediterranean from the African coasts, often on small boats.
Although most arrived on European coasts, many drowned
during their attempt to reach Europe. The president of the
European parliament, Martin Schulz, said in 2014 that Europe’s
migration policy ‘turned the Mediterranean into a graveyard.’
Despite many alarms on this regard, given that the travelling
time for migration is much longer than the incubation time of
HID, it is improbable that an HID could be introduced in
Europe by migrants.
Purpose
Our purpose was to update the survey of isolation capabilities
performed in 2010 in countries participating to the EuroNHID
project. A complete survey of isolation capabilities and re-
sources in Mediterranean countries is not available. A mutual
knowledge of available resources in different countries is
essential in order to promote the establishment of collabora-
tion agreements in case of arrival of patients with HIDs in
countries without the necessary resources for their safe man-
agement. Our first aim was to describe the status of knowledge
about the availability of HLIUs and other isolation facilities in
Mediterranean countries. We also sought to provide recom-
mendations about the optimal and minimal features and capa-
bilities for HLIUs and other isolation facilities in order to
support countries that are not equipped to establish these
structures.MethodsDefinitions
We define, according to EUNID, an HLIU as a health facility
specifically designed to provide safe, secure, high-quality and
appropriate care, with optimal infection containment and pre-
vention and control procedures for a single patient or a small
number of patients who have or who may have an HID. In
particular, HLIUs are equipped with special technical and lo-
gistic features for an effective isolation (i.e. negative pressure,nses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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dedicated pathways) and are able to operate as an independent
unit, without the need to share areas with other settings not
dedicated to isolation of HID patients.
We define as an isolation facility all other health facilities
(such as isolation rooms with some technical features inte-
grated within a general ward) identified by National Health
Authorities for the isolation of patients with confirmed or
suspected HIDs.
We refer to isolation settings for both HLIU and other
isolation facilities.
Data from EuroNHID project
In 2010, the EuroNHID conducted a cross-sectional analysis
of isolation resources in Europe, recruiting 48 isolation set-
tings in 16 countries. Among Mediterranean countries, France,
Greece, Italy, Malta and Slovenia participated in the survey, in
addition to the United Kingdom, as well as some British
Overseas Territories (Gibraltar and Akrotiri, and the Dhe-
kelia areas in Cyprus). Isolation settings were selected by
national health authorities and were assessed through on-site
visits using standardized questionnaires specifically developed
for the project. Most of the EUNID and EuroNHID partici-
pants continued to collaborate in formal and informal ways;
any changes and updates since 2010 have been promptly
shared.
Data from countries not included in EuroNHID project
For countries that are not part of the EuroNHID network, a
specific web search was performed using the following search
terms: ‘highly infectious diseases’; ‘highly contagious diseases’;
‘high-consequence pathogens’; ‘BSL-4 agents’; ‘isolation unit’;
‘isolation facility’; ‘high-level isolation unit’; and ‘high-security
infectious diseases unit,’ coupled with the name of the country
or with the name of the country’s capital, where these facil-
ities are likely to be located. In some cases, when the capital is
different from the main city, we searched for both (e.g. for
Turkey we searched both for Ankara and Istanbul). This web
search was performed both on PubMed and on commonly
used web search engines (such as Google). In some case,
contacts with national health authorities and/or with people
well known for their expertise in the field of HIDs were
informally established in order to collect direct information
about the availability of isolation settings for HIDs in their
countries.
Recommendations about optimal and minimal features
and capabilities
Our recommendations derive from the consensus documents
produced during EUNID and EuroNHID projects by the expertThis is an open access articpanel. The recommendations were updated, where necessary,
according to experiences from the Ebola outbreak, especially
the management of imported cases in Western countries.ResultsAvailability and location of HLIUs and isolation
facilities in the Mediterranean countries
According to the available data, health settings specifically
dedicated to isolation of patients with suspected or proven
HIDs are available in 48% (11 of 23) of the Mediterranean
countries or territories. Countries equipped with such isolation
settings are Cyprus, France, Israel, Greece, Italy, Lebanon,
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Slovenia and Spain. However, data from
two countries (Libya and Morocco) are partial and need to be
confirmed. Among these countries, at least five have an avail-
able HLIU (France, Greece, Israel, Italy and Spain). Among the
14 countries or territories in the European region (including
Turkey), seven (50%) have some isolation settings (HLIU or
another isolation facility). This rate is the same among Middle
Eastern countries or territories (2/4, 50%) and is a little lower
among North African countries (2/5, 40%, but in both cases
data are partial).
Details about isolation settings are reported in Table 2, and
geographic distribution of isolation settings are reported in
Fig. 1.
In order to support the readers in understanding the
structural features and technical/logistic capabilities of an HLIU,
we describe in more details the units available and functioning in
Rome and Marseille.
At the National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI) ‘L.
Spallanzani’ in Rome, an HLIU with one bed is placed inside a
dedicated ward. Another special HLIU of one bed with
intensive care capabilities is available. Both units are sealed and
equipped with anteroom, negative pressure, HEPA filtration of
both supply and exhausted air, dedicated pathway for patient
admission and two separate staff entry and exit routes with
dedicated areas for personal protective equipment (PPE)
donning and doffing. Both units have special procedures for
autoclaving, and the unit with intensive care capabilities is
equipped with a dunk tank for decontamination. A task force
of HCWs specifically trained for facing HIDs is available. The
INMI has cabinet line of biosafety level (BSL) 4 and BSL-3
laboratories available in the same campus, with the capacity
to conduct advanced laboratory tests, including all agents of
viral haemorrhagic fevers, other HIDs and other relevant
agents for differential diagnosis. Other INMI capabilities
include a BSL-3– like autopsy suite, specific procedures for
safely performing diagnostic medical imaging and specially© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd, NMNI, 26, S65–S73
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
TABLE 2. Summary of isolation capabilities in Mediterranean countries and territories, with special reference to coastal cities
Country/Territory
Availability of isolation
facilities Brief description of available data
Albania No data found
Algeria No data found
Bosnia-Herzegovina No data found
British Overseas Territories
(United Kingdom)
None No isolation facilities are available in Gibraltar, Akrotiri and Dhekelia. In case of need, a protocol for Air Medical
Evacuation is implemented for the safe transport of patients to the HLIU of the Royal Free Hospital, London, UK.
Croatia No data found
Cyprus Yes An airborne infection isolation room is available at Nicosia Polyclinic in the capital city. Some media reports refer to
special isolation units in Limassol, but no further details are available.
Egypt No data found
France Yes Thirteen hospitals have been identified by national authorities for the management of HIDs. Among them, six are
HLIUs, including two in Paris. A total of 113 isolation beds are available in the country. Among coastal cities,
Marseille is equipped with an HLIU.
Greece Yes Six hospitals have been identified by national authorities for the management of HID. Among them, one is an HLIU,
located in Athens. Twenty isolation beds are available in the country. All hospitals are on coastal cities (Athens,
Thessaloniki, Crete).
Israel Yes One hospital in a coastal city, Haifa, has been identified for the management of HIDs, where a portable, modular,
freestanding isolation unit with one bed has been constructed using a customized negative-pressure tent.
Italy Yes Two hospitals have been identified by national authorities for the management of HIDs. Both are HLIUs, including
the main referral national unit, in Rome, a coastal city. Five isolation beds are available in the country.
Lebanon Yes One hospital in a coastal city, Beirut, has been identified for the management of HID, where an isolation unit
equipped with negative pressure and dedicated entrance has been constructed. No details are available about the
number of beds.
Libya Partial data found Some media reports refer to a special isolation unit, but no further details are available.
Malta Yes One hospital in a coastal area, Msida, has an isolation facility, with three isolation beds available.
Morocco Partial data found Some media reports refer to a special isolation unit in Rabat, but no further details are available.
Monaco (Principality of) No data found
Montenegro No data found
Palestine (West Bank and
Gaza Strip)
No data found
Slovenia Yes One hospital in Ljubljana has an isolation facility, with two isolation beds available. No other units are present in
coastal cities.
Spain Yes Some hospitals have been identified by the national authorities for the management of HIDs, including a HLIU in
Madrid with two isolation beds. Among coastal cities, data are available for Barcelona, where isolation facilities are
available in five hospitals.
Syria No data found
Tunisia No data found
Turkey No data found
HID, highly infectious disease; HLIU, high-level isolation unit.
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During the recent Ebola outbreak, two confirmed cases were
admitted in HLIUs. Both patients recovered with no secondary
transmission to HCWs.
The IHU university hospital in Marseilles is one of 12 French
reference centres for bioterrorism and management of emerging
infections and outbreaks. L’Institut Hospitalo Universitaire Méd-
iterranée Infection laboratory is authorized to test suspected
anthrax spores and all other bioterrorism agents. We also admit
patients with multidrug-resistant and extensively drug-resistant
tuberculosis, as well as suspected cases of SARS or MERS coro-
navirus andEbola haemorrhagic fever, aswell as any patientwho is
a victim of a yet undiscovered but highly contagious emerging
infectious agent. The third floor of L’Institut Hospitalo Uni-
versitaire Méditerranée Infection building is dedicated to BSL-3
activities with 1450 m2 for BSL-3 laboratories including a BSL-3
necropsy room and a 1300 m2 BSL-3 healthcare ward, including
a BSL-3 point-of-care laboratory [9]. The latter is dedicated to the
care of contagious patients and has been built according to the
most recent recommendations [3,4,10]. During routine care,
except in times of sanitary crisis, 25 single bedrooms can be used
individually with negative pressure (−50 Pa) or positive pressure
(+20 Pa) to treat patientswith diseases such as Beijing genotypeor© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd, NMNI, 26, S65–S73
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licemultidrug-resistant tuberculosis as well as immunocompromised
patients with febrile neutropenia, but also to optimize the care for
Clostridium difficile colitis or emergingmultidrug-resistant bacterial
infections. In times of sanitary crisis, the ward can be used as a
modularly BSL-3 HLIU (8 + 7 + 10 beds) for patients with highly
pathogenic microorganisms; facilities include secure anteroom
access, a dedicated nurse room, autoclave and point-of-care lab-
oratory. Each room is equipped as stated above and has video
surveillance. The whole building is equipped with Wi-Fi, thus
allowing communication for long-term isolated patients. Bedside
radio imaging, chest X-ray and echography performed by a skilled
medical doctor are available. Transportation to another technical
unit is possible with the use of an isolator stretcher. A short demo
movie is available (https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_
continue=16&v=TkoVFP8PX44).
Recommendations about optimal and minimal logistic,
infrastructural and technical features for isolation
settings
Main recommendations about optimal and minimal logistic,
infrastructural and technical features for HLIU and other
isolation facilities are summarized in Table 3 and referenced in
Supplementary Material S1.nses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
FIG. 1. Distribution of isolation settings in Mediterranean countries.
NMNI Fusco et al. Infectious diseases in the Mediterranean Sea area S69Logistics
HLIUs and isolation facilities are usually intended to provide
care only for small numbers of patients. In case of increase in
patient numbers, a surge capacity plan should be implemented
in order to improve isolation capabilities.
The geographical location of isolation settings for HIDs
should be chosen with respect to distance from main airports,
ports and BSL-3/4 laboratories. Usually these isolation settings
are located within or in close proximity to the main country’s
major city or cities. Given the broad range of underlying
medical conditions and the possible complications in case of
HIDs, these isolation settings should optimally be located within
or in close proximity to general tertiary-care hospitals, where
consultants should be on call in case of need. At the same time,
HLIUs should preferably be located in a stand-alone building; if
located in the same building as other hospital services, its units
should be functionally and logistically independent, with a
dedicated pathway for the patients’ entrance and with the full
capability to operate independently from other hospital
services.This is an open access articThe routine use of HLIUs and other isolation facilities for
other types of patients who need to be isolated (e.g. tubercu-
losis or other multidrug-resistant infections) or alternatively the
dedicated use of HIDs only represent two possible and different
strategies. The optimal strategy is still controversial because
both solutions have advantages and disadvantages. On the one
hand, the main advantages of the routine use are:
 Because construction and maintenance is usually very
expensive, routine use on daily basis can enhance
economical efficacy.
 The possibility to exercise frequently some of the procedures
used also during the admittance of HID patients, such as the
use of PPE and the procedures for their donning and
removal. Moreover, if an HID patient is admitted, HCWs
are already familiar with the isolation facility and equipment.
 The frequent use of some technical devices, such as negative
pressure and HEPA filter. In this way, the facility is
constantly monitored and each technical/functional
inadequacy may be noticed and resolved in a timely manner.© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd, NMNI, 26, S65–S73
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
TABLE 3. Recommendations regarding optimal and minimal features and capabilities for HLIUs and other isolation facilities
Recommendation topic Requirement Description
Recommendations about
optimal and minimal logistic,
infrastructural and technical
features for isolation settings
Optimal requirements  Isolation settings for HID care should be sited so that in-country patient journey and specimen transport times
do not exceed 6 hours.
 They should be colocated with a parent tertiary-care facility able to provide appropriate specialized support.
 They should be located in or next to, the population centre nearest to the country’s major international airport
and/or in proximity to BSL-4 laboratories to provide rapid containment in case of occupational exposure.
 Regularly exercised standard procedures for becoming fully operational for the management of a patient within
4 to 6 hours must be ensured.
 The isolation setting should be able to operate as much as possible independently from other hospital areas.
 Dedicated pathway for the patients’ entrance to the isolation setting should exist.
 Ventilation systems used must be independent of the other building heating, ventilation and air conditioning
systems.
 Air flows and pressure gradients run from the cleanest to the most contaminated areas with the patient room at
negative air pressure relative to adjacent areas.
 Both supplying and exhausting air should be HEPA filtered.
 Each patient room should have an anteroom.
 The presence of separate way-in and way-out to the isolation room for HCWs is preferred.
 Emergency evacuation protocols should exist and be tested regularly.
 Consider the installation of secure communications systems, systems for the patients’ observation without
entering and self-closing doors.
 Any equipment used within an isolation facility should be selected with decontamination in mind, all materials
should be easy to clean and no porous materials should be used.
Minimal requirements  At least functional, if not structural, independence from other facilities is indispensable for any type of facility to
promote infection control.
 At the same time, location near a general hospital is essential.
 These units should be fully operational within 6 hours after a case is notified.
 Basic technical requirements (negative pressure, anteroom, HEPA filtration of exhausting air, sealing of the room
and appropriate material) must be fulfilled in any setting responsible for HID patients.
 National emergency response plans should include either identification of an isolation setting within the country





Optimal requirements  All isolation settings for HIDs should be able to perform supportive intensive care within the isolation area.
 All isolation settings for HIDs should have a minimal set of emergency care equipment permanently accessible in
order to allow a short-term stabilization of patients and should provide permanent access to adequate
equipment for the monitoring of vital signs (such as ECG and blood-pressure monitors).
 Basic diagnostic procedures (e.g. radiograph and ultrasound) should be provided within the isolation area with
portable machines.
 Equipment and instruments for intensive care should be dedicated to the HID patient only and not reused
before careful decontamination process.
 Equipment for children care should be available too.
 A core group of HCWs (both physicians and nurses) should be preidentified on a voluntary basis and specifically
trained for dealing with HIDs.
 The trained staff should include at least doctors and nurses specialized in infectious diseases, intensive care and
infection control. Technicians for the monitoring of isolation settings are essential too.
 Other specialist consultants should be preidentified and ideally trained with the core staff.
 A BSL-3/4 laboratory should be located nearby the isolation setting. If not, preexisting protocols for the referral
of samples should exist.
 Procedures for the decontamination of samples should be in place.
 Routine tests should be performed within the isolation setting and in the nearby BSL-3/4 laboratory.
 Safe transport capabilities for HID patients should exist.
 Detailed protocols should be available for selection, storage, supply, and donning and removal of PPE.
 Safety-engineered devices should be used, together with other standard procedures, for the reduction of risk of
needle-stick injuries.
 For the management of solid waste, autoclaving is considered the preferred option, even if other strategies such
as chlorine spraying are possible.
 Liquid waste should be chlorinated before disposal.
 Human remains should be managed according to predeveloped infection control protocols. Autopsies are
discouraged; if needed, a specially equipped autopsy suite should be provided.
Minimal requirements  If not possible within the isolation setting, intensive care should be provided within the ICU after the evacuation
of all other patients and the drawing up of ICUs for the isolation of the HID patient.
 All medical instruments used within isolation settings should be dedicated to the HID patient only.
 The staff should include at least specialists in infectious diseases and infection control. A basic training is essential
before dealing with HID patients.
 An agreement with a BSL-3/4 laboratory is essential for the referral of samples that need to be processed in
highly secure laboratory settings. All specimens should be disinfected and sent according to international
rules for the shipping of dangerous material.
 Routine biochemistry and haematology tests should be performed in a BSL-2 laboratory; if other solutions are
not available, tests should be performed only with closed-system, automatic analyzers, which should be moved in
a dedicated room.
 In case of transport of HID patients with a normal ambulance, specific decontamination procedures should be
developed.
 Detailed infection control procedures should be developed, employed and continuously monitored: these
procedures should include correct use of PPE, policies for reducing the risk of needle-stick injuries,
disinfection and decontamination process, management of solid and liquid waste and procedures for the
management of human remains.
References are listed in Supplementary Material S1.
BSL, biosafety level; HCW, health care worker; HEPA, high-efficiency particulate air; HID, highly infectious disease; HLIU, high-level isolation unit; ICU, intensive care unit; PPE,
personal protective equipment.
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by:
 The need to evacuate the patients if a case of HID occurs.
 The limited access to the rooms for the training of HCWs in
order to be prepared if a HID patient seeks care.
 The need to decontaminate the rooms prior to the
admittance of an HID case.
Reserved use is preferred for the constant availability of
the unit, but a lack of experience in the use of the unit
may lead to mistakes which can in turn increase the risks
to HCWs. This risk can be reduced by periodic training
sessions, which are conducted in order to make these fa-
cilities familiar to the HCWs. Moreover, considering the
costs of these units, the reserved model may not be cost-
effective.
In any case, we recommend that these isolation settings
should be capable of admitting an HID patient within a few
hours of notification (4–6 hours).
Infrastructure and technical issues
Infrastructure-related technical equipment such as HEPA
filtration of exhausting air, negative pressure within isolation
rooms and the existence of an anteroom are considered
indispensable for all clinical care settings responsible for HIDs.
Any material used within the isolation area, including ceiling
and walls, should be easy to decontaminate, and nonporous
material should be used. Preferably, rooms should be equip-
ped with separate way-in and way-out pathways. In the way-
out pathway, the removal and decontamination of PPE
occur, so this area should be large enough and should be
provided with all the items needed. The one-way anteroom,
even if not ideal, may represent an option, but strict pro-
cedures for PPE removal and anteroom decontamination
should be in place. All isolation settings should plan a secure
evacuation pathway for both HCWs and patients if needed.
Finally, regarding technical issues, we recommend that exclu-
sive access to an autoclave be provided within the restricted
isolation area. Other solutions, such as access to an autoclave
on the hospital compound or in other locations, should follow
a strict policy for transport (and eventually predecontamina-
tion) of contaminated material.
Additional infrastructure issues may include the presence of
an internal communication system (in order to communicate
with the patient or with the HCWs within the room without
the need to enter); the presence of an observation window (or
alternatively the use of CCTV systems); the presence of nega-
tive pressure indicators; and the presence of a self-closing door
system that ensures that doors are kept closed.This is an open access articRecommendations about optimal and minimal
capabilities of isolation settings
Optimal logistic, infrastructural and technical features are not
enough for the appropriate and safe management of patients
with HIDs; some additional capabilities are essential. The rec-
ommendations for optimal and minimal capabilities of isolation
settings are summarized in Table 3.
Medical capabilities. Patients with HIDs may require a wide range
of interventions, including transfusion of blood or blood products;
cardiac, respiratory and invasive haemodynamic monitoring; mi-
nor surgical procedures (e.g. thoracocentesis); renal dialysis; and
mechanical ventilation. Therefore, ideally, HLIUs and other
isolation facilities should be equipped to provide the level of care
available in an intensive care unit. Moreover, some basic diag-
nostic procedures (e.g. radiography and ultrasound) should be
provided within the isolation area with portable machines.
Moreover, all instruments and materials should be dedicated to
HID patients only or used for other patients only after careful
decontamination procedures. Ideally, all medical equipment and
instruments should also be available for paediatric care.
Staff capabilities. The correct functioning of any facility dedicated
to HID care and the patients’ clinical outcome strongly depends
on the availability of preidentified and specifically trained
personnel. In order to reduce secondary transmission risks, the
number of staff with access to an HID patient should be limited.
However, given the burden of working under PPE, the number of
staff involved must be sufficient to allow breaks for each team
member to rest and recover. The staff should be selected on a
voluntary basis and should assist to periodical training sessions of
theoretical update of HID care and practical exercises within the
isolation settings, including repeated session of PPE usage, donning
and removal. The team should be composed by medical and
nonmedical staff with high-level expertise in their specialty. In-
fectious disease doctors and nurses are considered to be the core
element of each team. In addition, infection control specialists for
the monitoring of different procedures and technicians respon-
sible for the correct functioning of equipment must be included.
Because a patient’s condition may deteriorate quickly, the avail-
ability of both intensive care doctors and nurses familiar with life
support equipment is important. Other medical specialties may
also be needed, depending on the patient’s condition and/or un-
derlying diseases. Ideally, these consultants should be pre-
identified on a voluntary basis and should be trained in the basic
workings of PPE.
Diagnostic capabilities. It is important to place isolation settings in
the vicinity of a BSL-3/4 lab. This strategy assures both rapid
availability of safe and appropriate diagnostic testing for HIDs
patients and an appropriate isolation area for lab workers© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd, NMNI, 26, S65–S73
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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HLIU or any other isolation facility should provide a large panel
of differential diagnosis, including both HID agents and more
common pathogens, and the laboratory staff should be expert
in the management of BSL-3/4 agents. If the laboratory is not
close, predefined and safe procedures for the transport of
samples should be present, including procedures for the
decontamination of the specimens before transport.
Preferably, routine biochemistry and haematologic tests
should be performed at the bedside in a routine laboratory area
dedicated to the isolation setting. Alternatively, all tests,
including biochemistry and haematology, should be processed
in the BSL-3/4 laboratory. Under certain handling precautions,
the use of a certified autoanalyzer for routine tests has been
considered safe, even outside a BSL-3/4 lab, once the specimen
is decontaminated.
Other capabilities. Some other capabilities are recommended in
HLIUs and other isolation facilities. The transport of patients
should be performed with specially equipped ambulances and
stretchers. Transport through normal ambulances is possiblewith
the implementation of special procedures for the HCWs’ safety
and for decontamination. High-level PPE should be available and
adequately stored and monitored; infection control procedures
should be specifically developed, implemented with HCWs and
continuously monitored; the use of safety-engineered devices for
preventing needle-stick injuries should be promoted. Disinfection
is essential: procedures for the disinfection of reusable and large
items should be developed. Moreover, a storage area for large
items that need to be disinfected is needed. Management of
medical waste is a crucial issue too: autoclaving is the preferred
solution for solid waste, but other options (such as sprayingwaste
with hypochlorite before disposal) are possible. As for disinfec-
tion, an area of sufficient size for the storage of waste before
disposal is needed. Even if, according to most experts, their
release in the general drainage system is not dangerous, ideally all
liquid waste should be decontaminated before being released in
the hospital wastewater drain. Liquid waste can be decontami-
nated by chlorine and other chemicals or by physical treatments
with proven efficacy. Finally, procedures for the management of
human remains should be in place. Autopsies are discouraged, but
if needed, these procedures should be performed by HCWs
wearing full PPE in autopsy suites equipped with negative pres-
sure, HEPA filtration and nonporous materials.DiscussionAs a consequence of emerging threats posed by HIDs, the need
for an adequate hospital biopreparedness is currently© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd, NMNI, 26, S65–S73
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/liceincreasing. In particular, the existence of highly specialized
centres for referral of HIDs is important because HIDs for the
protection of HCWs, other patients and the whole community
require levels of infection control and clinical expertise that
cannot easily be provided in common healthcare settings.
Here we have provided an inventory of HLIUs and other
isolation facilities operating in Mediterranean countries. Ac-
cording to available data, the Mediterranean countries as a
whole are not sufficiently equipped for patients with suspected
or confirmed HIDs because adequate isolation settings are
present in less than 50% of the Mediterranean countries and
territories. Unsurprisingly, the availability of isolation settings
has an economic element: among the ten countries or terri-
tories classified as high income according to World Bank
Classification, almost all (except the Principality of Monaco and
British Overseas Territories) have some isolation setting
available and HLIUs are present in high-income countries only.
Among the remaining 13 Mediterranean countries or terri-
tories with an upper-medium or lower-medium income, only
three are equipped with specifically equipped isolation settings
(https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/
906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups).
The updated knowledge about isolation capabilities in
countries or territories within a common geographic area, such
as the Mediterranean, is essential. Indeed, microbes and dis-
eases do not recognize borders, and an HID epidemic may
become an international health emergency if not adequately
contained at its inception. The occurrence of an HID suspected
or confirmed patient in a country not adequately equipped may
cause an epidemic involving neighbouring countries. Conse-
quently, the knowledge of isolation capabilities and the exis-
tence of prearranged common strategies for referral and
isolation of suspected patients are essential for the prompt and
adequate management of these situations.
Given the paucity of data about HID management, all centres
with available clinical and diagnostic capabilities for these dis-
eases should work as a network in order to maximize knowl-
edge and share best practices. The previous experiences of the
EUNID and EuroNHID projects represent a valuable example
of successful collaboration: under the umbrella of these pro-
jects, all available standards and data about HIDs and isolation
settings in Europe have been produced. Moreover, other na-
tional networks among clinical centres for HIDs, such as those
operating in France and Germany, represent a good model of
integration. These collaboration activities should involve other
Mediterranean countries, even those which are not part of the
European Union, for a useful integration of different isolation
models and strategies.
As secondary objective, we present a set of recommenda-
tions about optimal and minimal logistic, infrastructural,nses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Despite the fact that these recommendations are largely
derived from the previous publication of the EuroNHID con-
sortium, some practices and lessons learned from the Ebola
outbreak experience have been integrated. Moreover, in
respect to the different economical status of the countries
around the Mediterranean Sea, we included in the recom-
mendations the minimal standards required for a safe and
effective isolation as well as clinical management of patients
with suspected or confirmed HID.
There are some limitations to our study. Data from coun-
tries not belonging to previous EUNID and EuroNHID projects
are unofficial and derive from personal information and grey
literature. Consequently, these data need to be confirmed or
eventually completed by official documents. This type of in-
formation is hard to obtain, especially from countries now
experiencing a war, such as Syria, or from countries with no
clearly defined central government, such as Libya.
Despite these limitations, we here provide useful data about
isolation capabilities in the Mediterranean region as well as
provide a useful tool for scientists and decision makers who are
planning to establish or improve the isolation capabilities in
their country or territory. We hope that this article may
stimulate an open discussion among the different countries or
territories in the Mediterranean area in order to provide in-
tegrated and effective management of the threats posed by
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